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Sultan: Recent Judicial Concepts of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

RECENT JUDICIAL CONCEPTS OF "CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT"
By

ALLEN SULTANt

It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for
vengeance ....
A pain can be inflicted upon the wrong-doer, of
a sort that does not restore the injured party to his former situation, or to another equally good, but which is inflicted for the very
purpose of causing pain. And so far as this punishment takes the
place of compensation . . . the prisoner pays with his body.1
Their judgment and their dignity shall proceed of themselves.
Heb. 1:7

IN

HIS penetrating study, A Sense of Injustice, the late Professor
Edmond Cahn posed the following hypothetical:
The defendant is convicted of treasonable utterances by which
he successfully sought to impair the moral and obedience of combat
soldiers in time of war. The sentence of the court is that he be
compelled to submit to a surgical operation on his vocal chords,
so that thereafter he may only bark like a dog. This affronts the
sense of injustice.
Here the main concern is with human dignity. From early
times, cruel and unusual punishments have been relegated to the
discretion of deity or destiny; law has pulled away from vengeance
and humiliation. Vicious and debasing punishments are felt to
dishonor the court and the humanity whose authority it wields....
Human dignity is one of the tacit assumptions of the law .... 2

With all due respect to the late New York University law professor, it is submitted that dignity has not substantially overcome
vengeance and humiliation:
Item: An escaped prisoner from a state institution is apprehended in
another jurisdiction. Extradition proceedings are undertaken. The
t Ford Fellow, New York University Law School; A.B., 1952, Syracuse University; LL.B., 1958, Columbia University; A.M., 1962, University of Chicago. The
writer wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. Sol Rubin, Counsel, National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, for his encouragement and cooperation.
1. HOLMES, TH4 COMMON LAW 40-1 (1881).
2. CAHN, A SENSE OF INJUSTICE 17 (1964).
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convict seeks federal habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that he was
forced to serve as a "gal-boy" - assuming the role of a female to

satisfy the desires of homosexual prisoners. He is denied relief.'
Item: A man is convicted of rape, and is sentenced to imprisonment.
In addition, the court orders that he be sterilized, even though the
operation will not interfere with his sexual desires or their gratification.4
Item: A man is arrested and cannot raise bail. Awaiting trial he is
forced to stay with 39 others,
crowded together in a room about 27 feet square, most of the floor
space being occupied by bunks tiered up along the walls and by
tables and benches. There is no place for the prisoners to move
about and no recreational facilities whatever are afforded. Youths
of 16 are herded together with hardened criminals. Even those
who are "mental cases", unless violent, are confined in the same
3. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952). He also offered to prove beatings
with a nine pound strap with five metal prongs that frequently caused him to lose
consciousness, and that he was forced to work in the boiling sun stripped to his waist
all day long without being allowed a rest period. To his claim of his constitutional
right against being subject to cruel and unusual punishment, the court left him to local
remedies in the requesting state due to "consideration fundamental to our federal
system."
An earlier successful attempt in the Third United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
resulting in a "split" between circuits, resulted in a reversal by the Supreme Court,
Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1949), reversed, 338 U.S. 864 (1949). The
reversal, a per curiam decision, was on the authority of Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114 (1944). In Hawk, which held that there must be exhaustion of local remedies,
there is dicta to the effect that federal courts will take jurisdiction of state cases under
habeas corpus when petitioner has exhausted his state remedies and substantially
shows a denial of a federal right. In this instance, there need not be "exceptional
circumstances of peculiar urgency" to warrant federal intervention in state proceedings.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented to the opinion of the Court in Sweeney. Pointing
out that due process demands standards of decency implicit in our system of jurisprudence, he declared: "If the allegations of the petition are true, the Negro must
suffer torture and mutilation, or risk death itself to get relief in Alabama," the
requesting state.
For further information, see RUBIN, THS LAW Olt CRIMINAL CORR4CTION 306, 385
n.90 (1963). For a discussion of the Johnson decision, see Note, Prisoner's Remedies

for Mistreatment, 59 YALz L.J. 800 (1950) ; Levin, Habeas Corpus in Extradition
Proceedings Involving Escaped Convicts, 40 J. CRIM. L., C.&P.S. 489 (1949).

4. State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912). The court held the vasectomy
not to violate Article 1, Section 14 of the state constitution forbidding cruel and
unusual punishment since it was easy to perform, does not cause inconvenience to
the subject and takes only three minutes. See also, People v. Blankenship, 16 Cal.
App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942). In the latter case, the court had the opportunity to invalidate the
Oklahoma sterilization statute applicable to habitual criminals on the- grounds that
it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment"; it chose, however, more technical
grounds to do so.
According to a recent study, thirteen states presently have "eugenic sterilization
statutes specifically applicable to 'criminals." They have varying standards with
respect to their application, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 46.12 simply stating it may be used
whenever "procreation is inadvisable." Morris and Breithaupt, Compulsory Sterilization of Criminals -

Perversion in the Law, 15 SYRAcusE L. Rgv. 738, 739 (1964).

Nor are the statutes of relatively old vintage. The UTAH CODx ANN. § 64--10-7
(Supp. 1961), has as its standard that the criminal "would be unlikely to be a proper
parent." See also, IowA Conn ANN. §§ 145.2, 145.9 (Supp. 1963), and N.D. CPNT.
CODE § 23-08-03 (Supp. 1963), the latter's standard being that the criminal's "children
would be social menaces or wards of the state." See also 84 Time (Nov. 13, 1964, p. 88).
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room ... there is only one shower bath for the use of the prisoners
and only one toilet bowl. Sometimes the sewage outlets are clogged
because they are as dilapidated as the rest of the structure.5
The possibility of tedium dictates that further examples not be

posed. Rather, attention shall be turned to a brief historical sketch and
the recent judicial interpretations of the eighth amendment provisions
proscribing "cruel and unusual punishments." This study will then
conclude with a discussion of the possible future role of that limitation
in the administration of criminal laws. More extensive discussion of

the topic has been rendered unnecessary by its coverage in The Law of
CriminalCorrection.6
5. Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 286 (Terr. of Alaska, 1951). The facts
also indicate, at pp. 286-87, that,
The jail physician has made an affidavit as to the unsanitary conditions of the
jail resulting from crowding 'and lack of ventilation and lack of adequate bathing
and toilet facilities and the danger of spread of contagious diseases ...
But the feature of the imprisonment which in some of its aspects comes most
closely to constituting cruel and inhuman treatment, lies in the ever present possibility of fire. The room where the prisoners are confined is heated by a coal
stove of ancient type, bulging in the middle, tapering above and below, with
flares at top and bottom. During the daylight hours the very number of the
prisoners would probably in itself guarantee that the fire would not spread
because it would be stamped out immediately, but at night when most of the men
are asleep, or endeavoring to sleep, on the floor, on the tables, in the bunks and
in the benches, a fire might conceivably get beyond control rapidly. There
is always the chance that among the prisoners is one so unstable in mind, or so
wicked, as to deliberately start a fire regardless of personal danger. Local records
indicate the jail and courthouse in this division, then located at Valdez, were
completely destroyed by fire from such an act of a prisoner. The only exit is into
and through the adjoining kitchen and the door between the kitchen and the
prison itself is necessarily kept locked to prevent the escape of prisoners. Nor is
there any other exit, or place that could be made an emergency exit without
danger of facilitating such an escape. Altogether, the place is not fit for human
habitation and to crowd into this room so many prisoners at once well justifies
the comment of representatives of the health service of the Federal Government
who referred to it as a "fabulous obscenity."
Another feature that should not be overlooked is the insufficiency of sleeping
accommodations, although that alone is not so important. There are altogether
fewer than 20 bunks to accommodate the 40 prisoners and accordingly they are
required to sleep in shifts. At night, when most of them prefer to sleep, they not
only fill the bunks but lie down on the floor, on the one table, and on the benches.
The court held, at page 289, that the phrase cruel and unusual punishments was
"obviously . . . relative." Consequently, the conditions were "scarcely deserving of
the
name when compared with the danger and misery under which our own soldiers . . .
now in action in Korea live - and die." The court concluded, at page 290, that,
"Dangerous as such a comparison may be, it is not to be abruptly excluded, remembering that the term involved is not capable of precise definition." In so doing, it
looked to the 1904 decision of In re Ellis, 76 Kan. 368, 91 P.2d 81, involving "a dark,
filthy, disease-breeding dungeon."
Having been a member of the group used as a basis of comparison by the court,
the writer cannot refrain from submitting, with all due respect, that the court "missed
the point" completely. Those of us in Korea, who comprehended the necessity for
our being there, believed that when we were "rotated stateside" we would return to
a society where the dignity of the individual vis-A-vis the state was still maintained.
This, after all, was the basic difference between the philosophies of the social systems
locked in combat on that ill-fated peninsula. We would not want to believe that, not
yet having been found guilty of any criminal act, we would be subject to conditions
which, in the court's own admission, were "inexcusable and shocking to the sensibilities
of all civilized persons."
6. RuBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 357-90.
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II.

Although it has been traced back to the Magna Charta,7 the first
specific proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments" appeared
in England at the end of the seventeenth century. In 1641, the Long
Parliament abolished the Star Chamber forever. However, so great
was the Gppresion of that institution, and so deep were the scars it left
in the memory of the English people, demands continued for a guarantee against similar behavior in the future by representatives of
8
established authority.
Immediately after the expulsion of the Stuarts, Parliament passed
"an act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject and setting the
succession of the crown." Intended as "a solemn condemnation of the
arbitrary and oppressive proceedings which had taken place in the
courts during the preceding reigns, ' the statute 0 set forth various
grievances, among them that "illegal and cruel punishments [had been]
inflicted" and then stated that "cruel and unusual punishments" shall
not be imposed."
American colonial leaders, who had fought for the "rights of
Englishmen," were well aware of this guarantee. Thus, one hundred
years later, in 1789, when James Madison placed the guarantee in his
draft of the amendments to the new Constitution of the United States,
it was approved by Congress with little debate. 2
Originally, the provision applied to the wanton infliction of pain 3
- punishments that "invoke torture or a lingering death."' 4 Thus, it
implied "something barbarous, something brutal, something more than
the ending of life."' 5
Ordinarily thought of in terms of "the thumbscrew, the rack,
burning at the stake, nailing one's tongue to the post, crucifixion, disembowelment, beheading, quartering, public dissection and the like," 16
the meaning of the eighth amendment guarantee changed with the
7. Note, Judicial Limitations on the Constitutional Protection Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 160, 161.

8. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) ; KORN AND MCCORKLE, CRIMINOLOGY
92 (1959).
9. Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 533, 34 Ati. 246, 247 (1896).
10. 1 W.&M. c. 2 (1688).
11. U.S. CONST. amends. VI-XIV; 2 STORY, CONSTITUTION § 1903 (1873);
Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1922).
12. Browdy & Saltzman, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An
Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 846 (1961).
13. Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1922).
14. In re Klemmer, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) ; Warmer, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 3 CATHOLIC U.L. Rtv. 117, 119 (1953).
15. Ibid.
16. Chapman v. Graham, 2 Utah 2d 156, 270 P.2d 821 (1954) ; In re Klemmer,
AND PXNOLOGY

supra note 14, at 446.
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progress of our civilization."? From generation to generation, as personal scales of values changed, affecting the total societal values, the
"outer limits" of characterization adjusted accordingly. What was not
cruel and unusual punishment in one era became so in the next.'
As we would expect, this enlargement of meaning was a slow
process since the determination of societal values is often a nebulous
venture. Thus, the cautious were deterred.' 9 In addition, traditionalist
judges were prone to look to the history of the provisions and its
meaning at the time of promulgation. The result was an uneven development, frequently very sketchy in nature.
These factors, as well as others,2" have permitted the three examples
cited above to fit within the restraints of the eighth amendment. Limiting the concomitant growth of that guarantee, and thus not allowing it
to keep pace with the increasing sophistication of our society, they
represented much of the "judicial atmosphere" at the time of the recent
decisions interpreting the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, decisions which we shall now discuss.
III.
The earliest case to be contained in the classification of "recent
decisions," and the only one more than three years old at the time of
writing, is the 1958 decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Trop v. Dulles.2' Trop had been convicted of wartime desertion, an
offense that resulted in his loss of citizenship under then existing
statutes.22 Desiring a passport in 1952, he brought an action for
declaratory judgment to have the courts affirmatively declare his citizenship. The Supreme Court held 5-4 that Trop was still a citizen and
deserving of the protection of the United States government, abroad
as well as at home.
Speaking for a total of four members of the Court, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren declared that deprivation of citizenship under these
circumstances constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to
17. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
18. Warner, supra note 14, at 118.
19. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir. 1952): To the defendant's claim that test to be applied was that punishment that "shocks the conscience
and sense of justice of the people of the United States," Judge Jerome Frank
responded that community standards are usually unknowable and that the necessary
reasonably good assurances of it cannot be obtained.
20. Id. Judge Frank also challenged the above characterization on the grounds
that it shifted the moral responsibility from the Judge to the "common conscience," a
process that is contrary to recognized judicial discretion in sentencing.
21. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8). As a result of his court martial conviction, Trop was
sentenced to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and a dishonorable discharge.
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the eighth amendment, since it destroys Trop's status in organized
society. This, to the Court, is not within the "limits of civilized standards" as they were established by the constitutional proscription. Where
do these standards come from? They are, according to the Court,
drawn from "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." 2 Those who feel this characterization will not
provide a proper basis for predictability should derive satisfaction from
the fact that, as the Chief Justice pointed out, civilized nations are
unanimous in the belief that statelessness is not a proper criminal
punishment.
The deciding vote, cast by 1r. Justice Brennan, was based upon
different grounds. In his concurring opinion, the penalty was measured
against the traditional-objectives of the criminal law as well as the war
power of Congress. Thus measured, it was found to be lacking. To
Justice Brennan, it r~presented naked vengeance and nothing more.
Even though the rule of "civilized standards" is nebulous at best,
even though it was the view of only four members of the tribunal, the
"Opinion of the Court" in Trop represents a major constitutional breakthrough. Not since Weems v. United States24 declared that the eighth
amendment proscription applied to the length as well as to the nature
or mode of the sentence imposed had the Supreme Court made such a
general statement regarding the provisions. In addition, the statement
in Trop constitutes a broader base for subsequent growth of the vitality
of the provisions than did that in Weems. As we shall soon see, this
possibility was not lost to the Court.
A second indication of the possible breadth of this new approach
to the eighth amendment resulted four years later in a case where neither
mode nor duration of punishment was involved. Rather, Robinson v.
California" involved a crime of "status," the type of statute too often
experienced in contemporary life.
The California legislature promulgated a law making one addicted
to the use of narcotics a criminal, and subjecting him to imprisonment
even though there is no.proof of possession or use in the state. Although
one would have believed that the Court probably would have struck
down the statute on established rules of criminal law, such as the
necessity for a criminal act or actus res,26 it chose the eighth amendment
proscriptions as a means of declaring the law unconstitutional. Mr.
Justice Douglas added in his concurring opinion, also predicated upon
23. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
24. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
25. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
26. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 652-54 (1957).
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cruel and unusual punishment, that "This age of enlightenment cannot
2T
tolerate such barbarous actions."
The Court's opinion in Robinson, written by Mr. Justice Stewart,
clearly distinguished the problems of mode28 and duration of sentence"9
from that at issue. It's encompassment of status within the eighth
amendment proscription, without precedent,3 0 resulted from the conclusion, which the counsel for the State recognized, that "narcotic
addiction is an illness."
This holding, "that a state law which imprisons a person thus
afflicted as a criminal . . . inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the fourteenth amendment,"'3 was not rejected by either
of the two dissents in the case. Rather, Mr. Justice Clark held that the
statute in fact represented "a program of compulsory treatment for
those addicted to narcotics," 2 and Mr. Justice White at the outset of
his dissenting opinion states that if the "conviction rested upon sheer
status, condition or illness or if he was convicted for being an addict
who had lost his power of self-control, I would have other thoughts
about this case."33 Although the jury was instructed that they could
convict Robinson "if they found simply" that his "status" or "chronic
condition" was that of being "addicted to the use of narcotics," Justice
White felt his conviction was based upon "the regular, repeated or
habitual use of narcotics immediately prior to his arrest and in violation
of the California law."'3 4 To Justice White, the majority used the constitutional provision as a means of imposing its own views of narcotics
control.
There is one further pronouncement from members of the Supreme
Court that merits consideration. One year-after Robinson the Court
denied certiorariin a case involving the imposition of the death penalty
for the crime of rape.3" To date, courts have upheld the death penalty
for rape, as well as for other infamous crimes, as not violating the
eighth amendment. 36 Yet, a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Goldberg, subscribed to by Justices Douglas and Brennan, contended that
the tribunal should look into the issue. In so doing, Mr. Justice Goldberg separated the evolving "civilized standards" test enunciated in
27. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 678 (1962).
28. Citing Wilkenson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
29. Citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
30. Parker, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071 (1964).
31. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
32. Mr. Justice Clark also felt that three months imprisonment was not "unreasonable" for one who has voluntarily placed himself in a condition that threatens
the state.
33. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685 (1962).
34. Id. at 686.
35. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
36. See generally, RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 338, 377.
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Trop from those of excessive severity and "unnecessary cruelty;" thus

predicating a possible three-pronged subsequent use of the constitutional
proscription.
Although strongly criticized, 7 this elaboration of the Trop doctrine seems to clearly establish it as a distinct consideration in measuring the nature of the punishment. Moreover, the decision in Robinson
(already followed in one state), 8" deals with the punishment or the
sentence imposed as an indirect means of reaching the statute determining the criminal act. This suggests that the concept of "civilized
standards" may become an instrument of constitutional decision making
sufficiently broad to encompass not only diverse situations as those in
the Trop and Robinson cases, but other subsequent determinations by
lower courts or by legislatures that deviate from modern, rational,
sophisticated concepts of criminal administration. Seen by one commentator as the result of a search by the Court for a euphemism to
develop "notions of substantive due process, 83 9 it is clear that if there
is "something in the wind," we shall in the future hear far more from

the Court than we have in the past with respect to the many possible
applications of that constitutional guarantee.
These concepts are slow to emerge. The Court must await the
proper cases. But, to this writer, the pattern suggests itself: "Meat"
may be placed upon what had been the relatively "bare bones" of the
eighth amendment -

a fact that may have been recognized by at least

some of the practicing bar in the last few years.4"
IV.
Judicial decisions from state and lower federal jurisdictions indicate that the new concepts of what may constitute cruel and unusual

punishments has not always been properly understood, or if understood,
accepted as binding on the state jurisdictions. 4 Aside from the Missouri decision following Robinson,42 perhaps the most significant opin-

ion in recent years is the 1963 decision of State v. Cannon4" in which
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the state's statute prescribing
corporal punishment as not violating the state constitutional proscrip37. Parker, supra note 30, at 1071. Professor Parker feels that this is a device
to mitigate the use of the death penalty, "Whether [the] death penalty in rape cases
is so irrational as to offend substantive due process, an issue that exists quite independently of the command of the Eighth Amendment."
38. State v. Bridges, 360 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1962).
39. Parker, supra note 30, at 1071.
40. Cf. U.S. CoNsr. amends. IV-XIV (Supp. 1964, at 21-4).
41. Id. at 21-24 (Supp. 1964).
42. State v. Bridges, 360 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1962).
43. 190 A.2d 514 (1963).
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tion against "cruel punishments" or the federal provision against "cruel

and unusual punishments."
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that "[t]he degree of civilization
which a people has reached, no doubt, is marked by their anxiety to do
as they would be done by."44 Yet few would acquiesce in the "justice"
of a sentence that directed them to the whipping post. Nevertheless,
between 1900 and 1945 Delaware has whipped over 1,600 prisoners.4"
Although the practice "was not effective in reducing the recidivism
rate,"4 6 Delaware still permits the lash as punishment for five crimes."
If the people of Delaware4" and their representatives believe in the
propriety of the punishment as a deterrent, one wonders why they also
make it a crime to take a picture of the whipping post.4 9 Indeed, even
carrying a camera near the post is similarly punished."0 Since paradoxes
are not supposed to exist in criminal enforcement practices, the only
possible answer is that the whipping post represents "naked vengeance"
- to borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Brennan in Trop, and that the

people and their representatives are ashamed of it. Yet, the State of
Delaware persists in prescribing the lash, a persistence that evidences
the generally accepted morality of their society. 1
In the Cannon decision, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized
the "generally accepted" view "that constitutional law to some extent
may be likened to a progressive science."52 They agreed this means
that "the words employed are not necessarily static but grow and change
as the conditions of modern society grow and change with the passage
of years."'53 They agreed that "constitutions are living documents."
Yet they upheld the validity of the whipping post.
Recognizing also the significance of the "historical context within
which a particular constitutional safeguard was first adopted,"

the

court felt it not their function to
recognize the modern view condemning corporal punishment for

crime and declare that the infliction of lashes as punishment is
the remnant of a cruel age, and should be declared to be a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against cruel punishments. 4
44. HoLmns, op. cit. supra note 1, at 44.
45. RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 359.
46. Ibid.

47. DxL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3905-08 (1953) ; grand larceny - up to 20 lashes;
burglary - 20 to 40 lashes; poisoning with intent to murder - 60 lashes; robbery
by violence - 40 lashes; wife beating - 5 to 30 lashes.
48. See infra, p. 281.
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 411. The fine is from $500 to $1,000 and costs
of prosecution.
50. Ibid.
51. HOLM4ES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 44.
52. State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 516 (Del. 1963).
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 517.
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Whose function was it? The court, in a classic statement of judicial
deference declared,
We think, however, that this change, this growth, this enlightened
meaning of words used in Constitutions, comes about by reason of
the beliefs of the people themselves. The change may not come
solely by reason of the individual belief of an individual judge.
What better way is there for the people to express an enlightened
attitude toward the punishment of crime than through their elected
representatives, the members of the General Assembly who, indeed,
hold their office for the very purpose of expressing the will and
beliefs of the people who elected them.
Today, however, there has been no legal and effective expression of the people speaking through the General Assembly
that whipping is a cruel punishment in the constitutional sense.
Indeed, we think we may judicially notice the fact that there is
undoubtedly a decided difference in view on the part of the people.
What the weight of public opinion pro or con is, we have no way
of knowing. Certain it is, however, that as yet the only constitutionally sound way of expressing the public sentiment, by act of
Assembly, has not condemned the imposition of lashes as a cruel
punishment.
It is the province of the General Assembly in its wisdom to
give expression to the public will. It may either by inaction permit
the practice to continue or, by action, condemn it as a cruel punishment. Judicial restraint and a proper recognition of the function
of the Legislative and Judicial branches of government compel us
to express no opinion upon the propriety of doing either.5"
The Delaware Court concluded its opinion by pointing out "that the
abolition of whipping as a punishment for crime in these States of the
Union which in the past provided for it, has uniformly been accomplished by legislative action," and that neither counsel nor the court have
been able to find a single case "in which a court as a matter of constitutional law held the punishment to be cruel and unusual and thus
prohibited." 7
Given the nature of the problem and the court's response to it, it
would be interesting at this point to enter into a discussion of the value
of judicial deference in a government established on the balance of
powers. It is submitted, however, that it would not be relevant to do so.
However valid the court's attitude may be as a general jurisprudential
proposition, in the Cannon decision the primary consideration was with
55. Ibid.
56. Id. at 518.
57. Ibid.
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the federal system - with Delaware's obligations under the federal
constitution - and not with theoretical, or even practical, problems of
Delaware's tripartite balance-of-power system.
By 1963, when Cannon was decided, the Supreme Court of the
United States had announced both Trop and Robinson. Indeed, the
court in Cannon cited Robinson for the proposition that the eighth
amendment "is binding upon the several States of the Union." 8 However, it held that the United States Supreme Court "has not as yet held
the punishment of whipping, in itself, cruel. It has spoken of it as
infamous, but that is possibly true of all punishment for crime. '
It is submitted that a specific condemnation is not necessary.
Should the doctrine of "civilized standards," those that represent the
maturing United States society, be deemed by the Delaware court in
their independent judicial judgment to no longer permit the whipping
post, it must outlaw that means of punishment - the personal values
of the people of Delaware and the previous legislative methods of change
notwithstanding. Since the cruel and unusual punishments provision
in the Federal Constitution 60 are directly applicable 1 to state governments,62 the duty of Delaware's highest court was as clear in that state
as it was in Missouri.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.

60. For a breakdown of state proscriptions of a similar nature, see RuBIN, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 367.
61. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1962) ; the fact that Wolf was overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), does not effect its validity for this proposition;
rather it substantiates it, as subsequent experience proved that the standard was
not met.
62. In Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. 568 (1883), Mr. Justice Story held that notwithstanding the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has no
appellate jurisdiction to revise the sentences of inferior courts in criminal cases "even
if the excess . . . were apparent on the record." This early holding, not overturned
until the 1909 decision of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909), was probably
based upon Story's view that the Eighth Amendment "provision would seem to be
wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it so scarcely is possible that any
department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct."
2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 11, § 1903. The persistence of this theory is evidenced by
the fact that Watkins was cited with approval as authority as late as 1947 in Hemans
v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1947), in sustaining a 5-year sentence state to
avoid giving testimony in a felony case.
Due to this constricted attitude, the Supreme Court held well into this century
that it does not set down any precise standards as to what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Wilkenson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). This holding was
buttressed by dicta in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892), to the effect
that the Eighth Amendment is not applicable to the states by means of the Fourteenth.
In 1922, the Court decided Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1922), indicating that this was no longer true. This new proposition was taken for granted by the
Third Circuit in Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1949), where the Court, at
255, said "We entertain no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by the state." With the belief that "history
is as potent a force as anticipation," the Court held, at 256, that the state's obligation
was both positive and binding.
The Supreme Court's reversal of Johnson, supra note 3, for failure to exhaust
local (state) remedies does not affect the validity of the view that the proscription is
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One decision from the federal courts indicates that the doctrine
of "civilized standards" has been recognized. Fulwood v. Cleminer
involved a prohibition by a prison warden against the holding of
religious services by the "Black Muslims" on the basis that they taught
racial hatred and that the services were likely to create disciplinary
problems. Even though there was evidence proving that both of the
warden's grounds for refusal were true, 4 the court found his treatment
of the prisoner 65 was unreasonable and constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. In so doing, it used as standards of evaluation the nature
of the prison rule that was violated and the physical, emotional and
mental background of the prisoner.
The Fulwood decision is noteworthy for a number of reasons.
Although the Supreme Court of California, in passing on a similar set
of facts a year earlier came to the opposite conclusion due in part to
the precepts of the Black Muslims,6" the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia refused to make any negative value judgment on
that faith as such.6 Although the court in Fulwood fully recognized
the needs and powers of the prison authorities in maintaining discipline,
binding on the states. Certainly this fact is inherent in Robinson v. California, supra
note 24, as well as in the reasoning of Mr. Justice Goldberg in his desire for the Court
to evaluate the sentence in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963). See also,
Browdy and Saltzman, supra note 12, at 828; RuBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 365.
Notwithstanding this authority, some still doubt its applicability, holding that
the questions of violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause are independent of each other, and that the fundamental prohibition
of the former is not part of the latter. Parker, supra note 30, at 1074. Those who
still hold this position do agree that the due process clause of the Fourteenth requires
that the states maintain "canons of decency and fairness which express the notions
of justice of English-speaking peoples even towards those charged with the most
heinous offenses." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Even they would
hold to the view, expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1958), that "a cruelly disproportionate relation between
what the law requires and the sanction for its disobedience may constitute a violation
of the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment, and, in respect to the
States, even offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." As Mr.
Justice Douglas points out in Sweeney v. Woodall, supra note 3, this is a most
restrictive approach. The latter remark, made in 1952, seems to be correct, as indicated by Robinson ten years later.
63. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D. D.C. 1962).
64. In spite of the order, a number of informed meetings were held. The prisoner
spoke on Muslim dogma and made derogatory remarks about the "white race." The
prisoner was then separated from the rest of the prison population for two years.
65. Ibid.
66. In re Ferguson, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417 (1961) ; Cf. Banks v. Havener,
234 F. Supp. 27 (D. Va. 1964). Unfortunately, the case was decided on the basis
of the religious freedoms provisions of the First Amendment, and not the proscription
of the Eighth.
67. Fulwood v. Clemme, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D. D.C. 1962), stating: It is not "the
function of the Court to consider the merits or fallacies of a religion or to praise or
condemn it, however excellent or fanatical or preposterous it may be. Whether one is
right about his religion is not a subject of knowledge but only a matter of opinion.
"It is sufficient here to say that one concept of religion calls for a belief in the
existence of a supreme being controlling the destiny of man . That concept of religion
is met by the Muslims in that they believe in Allah, as a supreme being and as one
true god. It follows, therefore, that the Muslim faith is a religion."
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it cited the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Robinson case as
authority for the proposition that mental and emotional factors can
constitute "unreasonable" punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Finally, in holding this to be unreasonable punishment, the court
took an individualistic approach, directing its attention to the recipient
of the treatment, and not merely to its mode, duration, or even - as in
Robinson - the status of being a member of a class or a group, in this
instance the Black Muslims. This factor of mental cruelty, although
recognized as early as 182568 was not fully established in the law.69
The wording in Fulwood permits one to hope that this is no longer
true, as it may now rest upon a firm foundation - that of the Supreme
Court test of "civilized standards" of a "maturing society."7
V.
Last spring the Georgia legislature passed a bill71 that to date has
resulted in the immediate release of 503 prisoners.72 These were all
men who would have continued to be incarcerated if a technicality in
the law had not been changed by the legislation. According to official
statistics of the State, last year's recidivism rate was 36 percent for
felons and 45 percent for misdemeanants.7 3 Yet, by the middle of
October, 1964, only 12 of the 503 prisoners released were re-sentenced
to the penal system of Georgia.7 4
Notwithstanding the fact that with time more of the released
prisoners will again no doubt be recommitted, and that others may
choose to perpetrate crimes outside the State of Georgia, the extremely
low rate of recidivism for those who were properly convicted" constitutes further evidence76 of a basic fallacy in our system of judicial
sentencing and of our concepts and methods of punishment.
It would carry us too far afield to enter into an extensive discus68. James v. Commonwealth, 12 S.&R. 220 (Pa.). See also Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
12 Fed. Cas. 252 (No. 6546) (C.C.D. Calif., 1879), where the cutting of a Chinese

prison's queue was held to be cruel and unusual punishment.
69. See the opinion of the four dissenting judges in Francis v. Resweber, 329

U.S. 459, 472 (1922).
70. RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 389-90.
71. GEORGIA LAWS, 1964, Senate Bill 218.
72. Letter to the writer from R. H. Burson, Director, State Board of Corrections,
dated October 16, 1964.
73. STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS REP. 77 (1962-3).
74. Supra note 72.
75. The Bill, supra note 58, requires the recomputation of time to be served in all

cases where the court at the time of imposition of sentence was silent as to whether

or not two or more sentences were to be served consecutively; in other words, unless
the judge specifically directed that multiple sentences be served consecutively, this Bill
required that the sentences be recomputed and the defendant permitted to serve time
concurrently. For the general rule see RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 415.
76. RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 661-62.
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sion of punishment in general." For our present purposes it is sufficient
to point out that,
In studying what is, we cannot totally rule out what ought to be.
.. . Whatever may be the possibility of complete detachment in

dealing with physical things, in social life we cannot afford to
disregard the values and goals of acts without missing the significance of many of the facts involved.7
Thus,
Any discussion concerning justice and the treatment of human
beings may proceed on the different levels of sentiment, moral
values and objectively determined facts. . . . Our final judgment
must necessarily be a compound of [. . . all three] if we are to

avoid the errors of pre-scientific inquiry on the one hand or the
totalitarian
negation of human values of Nazi Germany on the
79
other.

The eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
l)uInishment was born from the consequences of man's inhumanity to
man."0 Its inclusion in our fundamental law is based upon the philosophy that it is better "that a potentially dangerous individual be set
free than that the least degree of impairment of an individual's basic
constitutional rights be permitted."8 '
The recent decisions by the federal courts discussed above represent the view that the Bill of Rights is not a static document. Rather
than being limited to Eighteenth Century concepts, the values it embodies are ever in a state of adoption. and change, 82 resulting from the
impact of the ever increasing knowledge of man, of his environment
and of the interaction of one with the other.
Abraham Lincoln once said that "[Jiudicial decisions are of
greater or less authority as precedents, according to circumstances.
That this should be so, accords both with common sense, and the customary understanding of the legal profession. "8" Thus, in 1892 the
Supreme Court still held that the length of a sentence does not make
it "unusual" ;84 seventeen years later it changed its mind. 5 Whether
77. The writer is presently preparing another paper on this subject.

78.

WIRTH,

MANNHI14M,

ID4OLOGY

AND

UTOPIA:

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

THt

SocIoLoGY or KNOWL4DCG, Preface (Wirth and Shils transl. 1936).
79. Taylor, CorporalPunishment and the Courts, 407 N.Z.L.J. 23 (1963).
80. See note 8 supra.
81. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3rd Cir. 1949) (per O'Connell, J.).
82. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
Rgv. 1, 19 (1959).
83. LINCOLN: SPSECHS AND WRITINGS 355 (1946) (Basler Ed.).
84. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
85. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
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it be changing its views on specific points such as the length of sentence,
or on the general application or interpretation of the entire provision,
such as represented by the Trop and Robinson decisions, where the
words are general 6 and the tradition is established, 7 the procedure is
not only proper, it is desirable; to do otherwise would be to permit the
dead to bury the living.
In our society, the criminal is a member of a political minority.
Moreover, the nature of his status removes most of the relative political
power that even a minority group can command. Thus, it is the courts
that can best protect his rights.8 " This is one of the lessons of our
constitutional history.
Often the state courts have properly responded to this fact of
political life when interpreting provisions proscribing "cruel and unusual punishment." 9 Often, they have not.9" When they do not they
support not "the law of the land," but the mood of the electorate, the
experimentation of the officials, 9 ' or a blindness to the advancement of
knowledge in the society in which they function and of which they
constitute a vital factor.
Prisoners may still be whipped in Delaware. 2 Its courts may not
understand the irrationality9" of the position of the "people" of the
86. Wechsler, supra note 82, at 32.
87. Id. at 31.
88. Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. CHi. L. Rtv. 661, 694 (1960): "A majority, as De Tocqueville and John Stuart
Mill have indicated, can be despotic. It is, accordingly, the quintessence of democracy
for an appointive judiciary to further the ends of the integrity of the individual."
89. State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
90. State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (1963) ; State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d
788 (1952).
91. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 280 (1948) (per Rutledge, J.) : "...
so long as
the bill of rights is regarded here as a strait jacket of Eighteenth Century procedures
rather than a basic charter of personal liberty . . . experimentation may be expected
from the states. And the only check against their effectiveness will be the agreement
of the majority of this Court that the experiment violates fundamental notions of
justice in civilized society."
92. State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514 (1963).
93. Taylor, supra note 79, at 408-09:
Other evidence on the effect of judicial corporal punishment is embodied in
official reports that were presented to the Canadian and English Parliaments
recently. The Canadian committee agreed with the Police view that corporal
punishment was not effective against the recidivist, the hardened criminal or the
sexual criminal. In other cases the Police and prosecuting authorities differed
from prison authorities and those in close contact with criminals about the deterrent value of corporal punishment. The committee commented:
The evidence indicated, however, that, in general, the concern of offenders
is to avoid arrest and imprisonment, and that they do not delicately balance
their intended crimes against the prospect of corporal punishment and that the
crime rate in other democratic countries of the Western world, as in the
United Kingdom, has not been affected by the presence or absence of corporal punishment.
The Canadian committee recommended the abolition of corporal punishment,
or alternatively a limitation on its use (1956 report).
Recommendations from Parliamentary committees in England were expressed
with less hesitation. The Cadogan Committee of 1938 heard opinions and sought
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State. If they do understand it, they certainly refuse to recognize it.
By refusing to follow their obligations as a judicial body in American
society and affording an American citizen his federal constitutional
rights, they are derelict in their duty. For the test is not satisfactory if
it merely asserts that the legislatures have declared themselves for then
94
the constitutional provision would be a futility.

To justify a decision regarding the federal constitution on the
basis of a relatively local attitude, its absence, or its impossibility of
determination is, indeed, a case of allowing "the tail to wag the dog."
The result is, of course, contrary to the "almost 95 complete abandonment of the most extreme penalties of death and physical torture"9 6
in the penology of the nation.97
facts, and firmly recommended the abolition of corporal punishment on the
grounds that:
We have been unable to find any body of facts or figures showing that
the introduction of a power of flogging has produced a decrease in the number
of offences for which it may be imposed, or that offences for which flogging
may be ordered have tended to increase, when little use was made of the
power to order flogging or to decrease when the power was exercised more
frequently. We are not satisfied that corporal punishment has that exceptionally effective influence as a deterrent which is usually claimed for it by
those who advocate its use as a penalty for adult offenders. (Cmnd. 1213
p. 3.)
Corporal punishment was originally introduced in England as a penalty for
young offenders by way of an alternative to imprisonment, but it was gradually
forsaken for more constructive methods of dealing with delinquents. Corporal
punishment for adults had been used mostly for offences of robbery with violence,
but one study of 440 men showed that those who had been flogged had worse
subsequent records than those who could have been flogged but were not. Corporal
punishment had not been available as a penalty for crimes of violence and sexual
offences, and the committee saw no wisdom in extending it and commented that
it was especially unsuitable for sexual offences because of the relationship between
aggression and perversion. Corporal punishment in England was finally abolished
in 1948.
The Barry Committee made a fresh study of the matter in 1960 and concluded that:
There is no evidence that corporal punishment is an especially effective
deterrent to those who have received it or to others. We recognize that in a
limited number of cases a sentence of corporal punishment would deter both
the offender who received it and other potential offenders; but the same could
be said of many forms of drastic and severe punishment which have long
since been abolished as affronting the conscience of a civilized community.
We are not satisfied that the numbers likely to be deterred are sufficient to
justify the reintroduction of a form of punishment that has manifold disadvantages .... We were impressed by the argument that the greatest deterrent to crime is not the fear of punishment but the certainty of detection.
94. RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 240-41.
95. Id. at 293. Today "Statutes in nine states expressly permit corporal punishment [.. . of prisoners]. Twelve states permit use of chains and shackles," although
they have been twice condemned by the United States Supreme Court.
96. Id. at 292: In 1939 "At least twenty-six prisons employed corporal punishment. Whipping with a strap was common. The Virginia "spread eagle," similar to
the medieval rack, stretched the body by ropes and pulleys. Men died or came close
to death in Florida's sweat box, an unventilated cell built around a fireplace. In
Michigan and Ohio, prisoners were kept in a standing position and unable to move;
in Wisconsin they were gagged; in West Virginia they were subject to frigid baths."
97. Sutherland, Is "White Collar Crime" Crime?, 10 Am. Socio. Rgv. 132 (1945).
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